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ABSTRACT 
The task complexity and size of public service organizations are arguably key 
determinants of their administrative intensity. Moreover, the combined effect of these 
two variables is also likely to have important implications for the scale of the 
administrative function. To explore the separate and combined effects of task 
complexity and size on administrative intensity in public service organizations, we 
examine the determinants of the relative proportion of resources allocated to central 
administration rather than academic departments in UK universities between 2003 and 
2008. The results suggest that there is a nonlinear u-shaped impact of both task 
complexity and size on administrative intensity, and that in combination these 
characteristics lead to a bigger central administrative component in universities. 
Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. 
 
 
 
Forthcoming in Public Administration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public service organizations are complex professional bureaucracies, large and 
frequently difficult to manage. Their effective management is dependent upon the 
creation of a cadre of central administrative staff and support units responsible for the 
coordination of organizational activities. The central administrative function of any 
organization typically comprises those personnel with no direct role in delivery of a 
service or production of a good, such as the senior management, central 
administrative divisions (e.g. finance, human resources), and clerical workers 
providing services to the whole of an organization. The central administration 
function is therefore distinguished from the production functions responsible for the 
delivery of services (e.g. professionals and street-level bureaucrats in public 
organizations, and their immediate administrative support personnel). The ratio of 
corporate administrative resources to the resources expended in service departments 
constitutes the central administrative intensity of an organization. Since the 
administrative IXQFWLRQLVDQ³RYHUKHDG´WKDW is added to service delivery costs, it is 
important to investigate its potential determinants. But what determines whether the 
administrative centre of a public organization is large or small?   
After a number of studies of the determinants of administrative intensity 
between the 1960s and 1980s, this topic has been largely neglected in recent years 
(Boyne and Meier, 2013).  Much of the previous work drew on various forms of 
contingency theory which posit that organizational characteristics are influenced by, 
or contingent upon, their external and internal contexts.  In a comprehensive review of 
the development of contingency theory, Donaldson (2001, 16) argues that the various 
VWUDQGV RI WKH FRQWLQJHQF\ YLHZ RI RUJDQL]DWLRQDO VWUXFWXUH ³PD\ EH LQWHJUDWHG E\
stating that there are two main contingencies, task DQG VL]H´ Furthermore, 
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contingency theory implLHV WKDW WKHUH LV QR µULJKW¶ OHYHO RI DGPLQLVWUDWLYH LQWHQVLW\
RWKHU WKDQ WKH OHYHO WKDW µILWV¶ FLUFXPVWDQFHV VXFK DV the complexity of the task an 
organization faces and the scale of the operations that are being undertaken  (Van de 
Ven, Ganco and Hinings, 2013).  In this paper we revisit the topic of administrative 
intensity in the public sector, and empirically evaluate whether task complexity and 
size are important influences on the proportion of resources devoted to administrative 
overheads rather than front-line service provision.  
We not only revisit the contingency perspective on administrative intensity, 
but also extend previous work in several ways. First the focus of prior work has 
usually been on organizational size, and in most studies only the linear effect of size is 
considered (Boyne and Meier, 2013).  In this paper we examine not only the effects of 
size but also whether task complexity makes a difference to administrative intensity in 
the public sector.  Second, we hypothesise that both task complexity and size have 
non-linear effects, and that increases in either of these organizational characteristics at 
first lead to lower intensity but eventually lead to higher intensity.  Finally, we 
hypothesise that complexity and size have jointly reinforcing effects on intensity. So 
that, for example, an increase in size is likely to have an especially strong positive 
effect in organizations that have high complexity.   
In past studies the issue of task complexity has largely been examined by 
focusing on the implications of alternative approaches to structuring the division of 
labour within organizations (see, for example, Hall et al. 1967). In particular, the 
number of different production units has long been regarded as an indicator of task 
complexity (Dewar and Hage 1978), and a potentially important influence on other 
organizational characteristics, including the relative intensity of central administrative 
activity (Kahn et al. 1964). According to the µcomplexity-administrative growth 
4 
 
hypothesis¶ (Rushing 1967), high levels of task complexity lead to an expansion of 
the administrative function within organizations, as the need to monitor and manage 
disparate production units poses new and complicated coordination problems (Blau 
and Schoenherr 1971). Moreover, the complexity-administrative growth hypothesis 
suggests that the size of an organization is associated with a growth in administration 
due to the sheer number of employees to be managed.   
7KHµFRPSOH[LW\-DGPLQLVWUDWLYHJURZWK¶ hypothesis stands in stark contrast to 
arguments on economies of scale and scope which suggest that complex large 
organizations benefit from the ability to spread administrative expertise across more 
functions and staff (Koshal and Koshal, 1999). Since most public sector organizations 
are big, divisionalized professional bureaucracies that employ large numbers of 
central administrative staff (Mintzberg 1978), these contrasting arguments about 
administrative intensity remain of considerable theoretical and practical importance. 
We evaluate the validity of these different perspectives on the administrative arm 
within public organizations by investigating the separate and combined effects of task 
complexity and size on the central administrative intensity of universities in the 
United Kingdom (UK) between 2003 and 2008. 
Do structurally complex organizations devote more or less resources to central 
administration? Is central administrative intensity higher or lower in big 
organizations? What are the combined effects of task complexity and organization 
size on central administrative intensity? To answer these questions, we carry out 
statistical analyses of the relationship between the number of production units within 
UK universities, the size of those institutions and central administrative intensity. 
First, we review prior research, which suggests that the relationships between task 
complexity and central administrative intensity, and organizational size and central 
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administrative intensity, may take a variety of forms. In doing so, we develop 
arguments about the relationships that we expect to observe in our analysis, by 
synthesising competing views on whether complexity and size have positive or 
negative effects on intensity. Thereafter, we outline our statistical model and the 
measures of central administrative intensity, task complexity and organization size 
used for the analysis. We then present our findings, discuss the statistically significant 
effects that emerge, and draw theoretical and policy conclusions from the tests that we 
have conducted. 
 
TASK COMPLEXITY AND CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
INTENSITY 
Arguments about the relationship between task complexity and administrative 
intensity within the organization studies literature were originally dominated by the 
³FRPSOH[LW\-administratLYH JURZWK K\SRWKHVLV´ 5XVKLQJ 1967). According to this 
perspective, increased differentiation of organizational structures poses coordination 
challenges that can only be met through the expansion of the administrative function. 
Donaldson (2001, 105) summarises the traditional contingency theory view as 
IROORZV³DGPLQLVWUDWLYHLQWHQVLW\LVUDLVHGE\WKHFRPSOH[LW\RIFRRUGLQDWLRQUHTXLUHG
through having more departments and other subunits, so that horizontal differentiation 
positively affects adminiVWUDWLYH LQWHQVLW\´ The relative degree of task complexity 
found within an organization is therefore likely to be connected to the demand for an 
extension of greater managerial control over the activities of a diverse range of units 
and employees. Kahn et al. (1964, 75 HPSKDVLVH WKDW DV ³WKH GLYLVLRQ RI ODERXU
becomes more differentiated and specialized; [so] more levels of supervision are 
introduced to maintain coordination and control; and more people become involved in 
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organizational planning´. The number of occupational specialties and production sub-
units within an organization are widely thought to be the principal indicators of the 
complexity of the task of coordination it faces (Hall, Johnson and Haas 1967). In 
particular, the relative divisionalisation of an organization is often regarded as the 
prime source of coordination problems (Mintzberg 1979), and this is sometimes said 
to be especially salient for the management of universities (Becher and Kogan 1992; 
Cyert 1978; Dearlove 1998). Indeed, an early study in US higher education provides 
some support for the complexity-administrative growth argument (Hawley et al. 
1965), as does 5DSKDHO¶VVWXG\RIORFDOODERXUXQLRQVLQ,OOLQRLV 
Although the complexity-administrative growth hypothesis is a persuasive 
one, a negative rather than a positive relationship between task complexity and 
intensity is also a plausible outcome. Organizations with more production units may 
actually be able to realise internal economies of scope that are simply unavailable to 
their less complex counterparts. Given that it is necessary to develop an 
administrative function large enough to meet the demands of coordinating more than 
one sub-unit, it seems highly conceivable that an organization with more production 
units can spread fixed administrative costs more widely than a less complex 
organization. In fact, the fixed costs of having an administrative function for even the 
simplest organization can potentially be turned very quickly into a valuable resource 
for managing growth in the number of different sub-units (Williamson 1981).  
While differentiated organizations may, theoretically, be able to distribute 
administrative capacity more effectively than those with fewer sub-units, it is also 
possible that at some point the realization of scope economies across horizontally 
differentiated organizations is exhausted as the number of divisions simply becomes 
too large to manage effectively from the centre ± something that is again thought to be 
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especially characteristic of higher education institutions (Dearlove 1998).  At this 
point, it is even possible that scope diseconomies will occur (and the complexity-
administrative growth hypothesis gains support), especially in large divisionalised 
professional bureaucracies, such as universities, that provide very distinctive and 
specialized services.  
Complex professional bureaucracies are frequently inflexible when 
confronting environmental change and may be plagued by internal conflicts between 
the centre and the sub-units, as well as between the sub-units themselves (Mintzberg 
1979). This propensity for internecine conflict leads Cohen and March (1974) to liken 
XQLYHUVLWLHV WR³RUJDQL]HGDQDUFKLHV´7KHSUREOHPVRIFRQWURO WKDWa high degree of 
departmental fragmentation can create in highly professionalised bureaucracies may 
therefore prompt the rise of excessive overheads as the centre seeks to obtain some 
kind of managerial grip on its errant divisions. Another way of thinking about this 
relationship is to consider the prospects for goal alignment in divisionalised 
bureaucracies.  
 Pondy (1969) highlights that initially task complexity may be associated with 
higher productivity, as organizations with more sub-units benefit from economies 
attributable to specialization. Similarly, for senior management, internal efficiencies 
can be achieved by spreading principal-agent hazards across multiple sub-units (Grant 
et al. 1988). Rather than having to confront a small number of very powerful and 
important departments, managers of a divisionalised organization may find it easier to 
µGLYLGH DQG UXOH¶ LQ SXUVXLW RI RUJDQL]DWLRQDO JRDOV Indeed, the distribution of 
production tasks into more and more specialized functions may be an especially 
efficient way for the corporate centre to monitor and manage operations.  However, a 
strategy of divisionalisation may eventually lead organizations to invest too much of 
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their time and money in the administrative function (Pondy 1969). It is likely that at 
some point the deliberate extension of central control in pursuit of further efficiency 
gains will create excessive overheads in the effort required to manage and support 
sub-units. Thus, once the slack in the administrative function is picked up by initial 
growth in the number of sub-units, the administrative budget will then increase 
beyond the point necessary for optimising productivity and goal alignment. This leads 
us to offer our first hypothesis on the determinants of administrative intensity. 
 
H1: There will be a u-shaped relationship between task complexity and administrative 
intensity.  
 
ORGANIZATION SIZE AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTENSITY 
In addition to the role that task complexity plays in determining administrative 
intensity, it is also important to consider the potential effects of the sheer number of 
employees to be coordinated (see Blau 1970). Organizational size has long been 
regarded as one of the most salient variables in the study of organizational behaviour, 
especially in terms of its relationship with organizational structure (see Hall, Johnson 
and Haas 1967; Kimberley 1976). Many scholars have suggested that the size of an 
organization has a direct positive link with the extent of bureaucratization, whether 
defined as formalization, specialization or centralization (e.g. Caplow 1957; Meyer 
1972; Mintzberg 1979). In addition to identifying a connection between horizontal 
GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ DQG DGPLQLVWUDWLYH LQWHQVLW\ WKH ³FRPSOH[LW\-administrative growth 
K\SRWKHVLV´VXJJHVWV WKDWcoordination is more difficult in bigger organizations.  As 
Donaldson (2001, 70- DUJXHV ³WKH FRQYHQWLRQDO ZLVGRP LV WKDW DV RUJDQL]DWLRQV
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grow in size they become top heavy....(and have) a rapid growth in managers and their 
DVVRFLDWHGDGPLQLVWUDWLYHVWDIIUHODWLYHWRWKHLQFUHDVHLQRSHUDWLQJSHUVRQQHO´ 
The number of possible social relationships within an organization increases 
as an exponential function of WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VVL]H&DSORZ 1957). The size of the 
administrative function therefore seems likely to outpace the growth in the number of 
social relationships to sustain central control of front-line service provision. Indeed, 
several early studies of the size-administrative intensity relationship support this 
hypothesis (e.g. Chapin 1951; Meyer 1972; Terrien and Mills 1955). However, the 
application of the complexity-administrative growth hypothesis to the issue of 
organizational size and administrative intensity rests on a number of rather 
questionable assumptions, especially the notion that administrative mechanisms of 
control need to be tailored to each and every social relationship within an organization 
(Freeman 1973). In fact, it is one of the supposed virtues of the Weberian-style 
bureaucratic organization that it is able to develop and apply standard and impartial 
administrative rules and procedures suitable for the management of very large entities. 
This propensity for standardization is the potential source of scale economies in the 
size-administrative intensity relationship. 
Several influential studies have suggested that bigger organizations can accrue 
internal scale economies, as the principal-agent challenges faced by the senior 
management within an organization remain essentially unchanged despite a growth in 
size (e.g. Blau 1972; Hall 1982; Pondy 1969). From this perspective, rather than 
adding to the challenge of coordinating a larger number of employees, being bigger 
can enable an organization to reap economies of scale as the same administrative 
practices can be applied across a larger number of individuals (Blau 1972). At the 
same time, larger organizations are better able to make cost-efficient use of 
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computerized management systems and techniques to handle routine administrative 
work. Bigger organizations are also equipped to make more complete use of any 
given level of administrative capacity, while smaller organizations may be plagued by 
the under-utilisation of human resources due to the indivisibility of labour and the 
fixed costs associated with providing core functions, which they may use less than 
their larger counterparts.  
Although numerous studies offer support for the internal scale economies 
perspective (e.g. Lioukas and Xerokostas 1982; Melman 1956; Tosi 1967), there is a 
third argument about the likely relationship between size and administrative intensity. 
This suggests that, as for task complexity, the relationship between organization size 
and the scale of the administrative function may be nonlinear. In particular, size may 
initially produce economies of scale in coordination that are eventually replaced by 
diseconomies of scale that result from bureaucratic congestion in very big 
organizations (AUTHOR 2003; Williamson 1967). Thus, size can have both positive 
and negative effects on administrative intensity, and the balance between them may 
alter as an organization grows. This view is implicit in the organization studies 
literature, which assumes that all organisations require some functions to be carried 
out centrally (especially the governance functions). However, after a certain point is 
reached, the administrative function becomes an expensive overhead that feeds on the 
resources of the service delivery units. Tullock (1965: DUJXHVWKDW³LWseems clear 
WKDW WKH GHFOLQLQJ µPDUJLQDO HIILFLHQF\¶ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK LQFUHDVLQJ VL]H ZRXOG
guarantee that a point would be attained at which further gains from expansion would 
EH OHVV WKDQ WKH DGGHG FRVW´  ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV DW VRPH WXUQLQJ-point the negative 
relationship between size and administrative intensity becomes positive. All of which 
implies the following hypothesis:  
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H2: There will be a u-shaped relationship between organization size and 
administrative intensity.  
 
COMPLEXITY, SIZE AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTENSITY  
Nonlinearity in both the task complexity-administrative intensity and size-
administrative intensity relationships may take several forms. In particular, given the 
potential for both task complexity and organization size to exhibit a u-shaped 
relationship with administrative intensity, it might be anticipated that in combination 
the interactive effect of these two variables would offer the most stringent test of the 
³FRPSOH[LW\-DGPLQLVWUDWLYH JURZWK K\SRWKHVLV´ (and, indeed, the internal scope and 
scale economies perspectives). That is, organizations that are both complex and big 
face the greatest coordination challenges and will therefore be most likely to require 
an especially concerted administrative effort. 
As complexity and size simultaneously increase, so do the prospects of 
bureaucratic overreach and congestion. When functional departments become both 
more numerous and larger, the prospect of time-consuming and costly inter-
departmental conflict is increased. To head off potentially damaging assertions of 
power by individual departments, the centre of an increasingly complex and growing 
organization will likely have to deploy extra central administrators. This implies the 
creation of additional work for managers responsible for furnishing departments with 
the human and material resources they require to remain well-integrated within the 
corporate organization. All of which is likely to add to the administrative burden on 
the centre (at least in the short term) (Cyert 1978).  
12 
 
Some early studies in private sector settings (e.g. Rushing 1967) uncover a 
complex array of interactions between task complexity, size and administrative 
intensity, but subsequent research has offered stronger support for the possible 
presence of a positive combined effect of the two variables on administrative intensity 
(Cullen, Anderson and Baker 1986; McKinley 1987). We therefore expect the 
interaction between size and complexity to have a positive relationship with the scale 
of the administrative function, leading to our final hypothesis: 
 
H3: Organizational complexity and size have mutually reinforcing effects on 
administrative intensity.  
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT, DATA AND MEASURES 
The data set for our analysis consists of 114 UK universities (90 located in England, 
12 in Scotland, 10 in Wales and 2 in Northern Ireland). We include only those 
universities that provide a broad range of courses for undergraduates and 
postgraduates. Thus, all twenty of those universities that were members of Russell 
Group in 2008 that together receive two-thirds of the research grant and contract 
funding in the United Kingdom are included in the sample. In addition, all but two 
(the Institute of Education, London and the School of Oriental and African Studies) of 
the nineteen ¶JURXSof smaller-research intensive universities are included, and we 
exclude the Open University due to its distinctive and geographically dispersed 
teaching model and organizational structure. We are fortunate in being able to draw 
upon a comprehensive secondary data source from which all the dependent and 
independent variables necessary for the study can be drawn: the Resources of Higher 
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Education and Students in Higher Education data published annually by the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA). 
UK universities represent an excellent context for examining whether task 
complexity and size have a statistically significant impact on administrative intensity. 
One consequence of the expansion and the marketisation of the HE sector in the UK, 
the United States and elsewhere is a widely reported rise in the numbers of managers 
in universities, which according to some estimates outstripped the growth of students 
and academics in the same period (Ginsberg, 2011; Morgan 2010; Ngok, 2008). To 
what extent does the ratio of administrative costs to those of production reflect the 
extent of task complexity? Does the size of the university influence this ratio? Do 
structurally complex big universities spend more on administration than their less 
complex smaller counterparts? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to 
identify relevant measures of administrative intensity, task complexity, size, and other 
relevant explanatory variables that may influence the size of the administrative 
function within universities.  
 
Dependent Variable 
Our administrative intensity measure is derived from HESA figures on university 
expenditure, and is based on similar measures in prior studies of universities 
(Gumport and Pusser, 1995). We derive the measure by dividing the total expenditure 
on administration and central services ± central administrative staff, general education 
expenditure (e.g. examinations) and staff and student facilities (e.g.careers advisory 
and occupational health services) ± by the total expenditure on academic departments 
in each university. We use this measure rather than a staffing measure because 
elements of the central services provided by some universities are contracted out (e.g., 
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occupational health, marketing), and so do not show up in the number of people 
directly employed by the institution.  The expenditure measure captures this central 
use of resource, even if the expenditure is not on members of the university 
workforce.  Nevertheless, we observed similar findings when using a ratio of the 
number of central administrative personnel to the number of academic personnel as 
our dependent variable (available on request). 
 Our measure is focused solely on the costs of administration in relation to the 
costs of production, and does not include the costs of technical services that are 
provided within universities, such as repairs and maintenance and catering. The 
measure therefore represents a good proxy for the administrative intensity of 
universities, and is akin to indicators used in previous studies of administrative 
intensity in public sector settings (e.g. Andrews and Boyne 2009; Bohte 2004). 
Similar results to those we present were obtained when we constructed a measure of 
central administrative intensity using only the expenditure on central administrative 
staff set against the expenditure on academic departments.  
 
Independent Variables 
Our measure of task complexity is constructed by counting the number of academic 
cost centres (key subject areas) for which each UK university returns expenditure data 
to HESA. The number of production sub-units has been used as a measure of 
complexity in several previous studies (e.g. Blau 1970; 1972; 1973; Cullen, Anderson 
and Baker, 1986; McKinley 1987). In total there are 34 different academic costs 
centres in the HESA data, ranging from clinical medicine through to design and 
creative arts (see Appendix A for full details). It is quite possible that some of these 
cost centres are more complicated to manage than others and that some combinations 
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of cost centres may pose more coordination challenges. However, as our sample 
FRPSULVHVµIXOO-UDQJH¶XQLYHUVLWLHVWKH\DOODOUHDG\KDGVRPHH[SHULHQFHRIPDQDJing 
units in the main disciplinary groups (e.g., biological and life sciences, physical 
sciences and social sciences), so adding a unit from any of these was not a radical 
innovation. At the same time, functional structures vary somewhat across universities. 
Yet, even if in practice specific cost centres are part of broader faculties of, for 
example, physical or social sciences, the presence of a wider range of subject 
specialisms in a university is likely to reflect significantly greater complexity in the 
coordination of the production of teaching and research. Non-linear effects of 
horizontal differentiation are tested by adding a squared version of the sub-units 
variable in the equation.  
The total number of staff employed by each university is used as the measure 
of size for the analysis. Although organizational size is a multidimensional concept 
(Kimberly 1976; Melman 1951), we focus on staffing levels because this is the 
variable that features in arguments about complexity in the organizational studies 
literature (see above).  This measure also provides a clear and transparent proxy for 
the operational scale of the main types of university within the UK HE system. 
Moreover, in the specific context of universities, staffing is a variable firmly within 
the purview of senior management. Both linear scale effects (raw size measure on its 
own) and non-linear scale effects (raw and quadratic terms in the model together) are 
tested. As a robustness check we also tested a measure of size based on the number of 
students in each university, and obtained very similar results for the nonlinear and 
interaction models (available on request). The staffing and student number measures 
are highly correlated (.60), so including them in the same model induces collinearity 
between the independent variables. Thus, in line with the previous research on this 
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topic, we favour the measuring gauging the size of the workforce rather than the size 
of the client base (e.g. Blau 1973; Cullen, Anderson and Baker 1973).  
 
Control Variables 
We include several measures which seek to distinguish and control for important 
organizational characteristics of UK universities. First, we include a measure of 
expenditure per head of staff to control for the level of resources in each university. 
We also add a measure of the budget surplus in the current financial year to control 
for the level of slack resources. Next we add several measures which seek to control 
for the type of institution included in the sample. In terms of the staffing structure, we 
measure the percentage of academics involved purely in teaching; the percentage of 
academics involved purely in research; and the percentage of all staff carrying out 
technical duties in support of specialist research: laboratory, engineering, building, IT 
and medical technicians (including nurses). In terms of the scope of the educational 
provision on offer, we measure the total number of different undergraduate and 
postgraduate degree courses offered by each institution; and the ratio of 
undergraduate students to postgraduates. Each of these measures captures and 
controls for key elements of the pattern of core activities within universities: teaching 
focus; research focus; technical complexity and specialisation. The descriptive 
statistics for all the variables included in the statistical models are shown in Table 1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The descriptive statistics illustrate that the average level of administrative 
intensity in UK universities increased by over 6 percentage points between 2003 and 
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2008. At the same time, the task complexity within universities expanded with on 
average half an additional department being added to the existing complement 
between 2003 and 2008. Moreover, the average number of employees within those 
institutions rose by about 15 per cent (from 2,618 to 3,012 members of staff). These 
data highlight the sharp expansion in the size of universities, the growth in 
complexity, and the rise in the percentage of resources devoting to managing them 
during the study period.  At the sector level, these variables have clearly moved 
together in the same direction.   
In the following analysis we proceed to evaluate the extent of the link between 
the growth in administrative intensity and changes in complexity and size when other 
variables are controlled. We also assess whether the connections between complexity, 
size and administrative intensity follow a nonlinear pattern, and whether these 
variables have mutually reinforcing effects.   
 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The pooled time-series used for the analysis is a balanced and complete panel data set 
for six years (2003-2008). The cross-sectional dominance, shortness of the panel and 
inclusion of dummy variables for each year of the analysis (minus one) minimize the 
threat of serial correlation (Stimpson 1985). :KLWH¶V  WHVW DQG WKH %UHXVFK-
Pagan test revealed that the models suffered from heteroskedasticity. To correct for 
nonconstant error variance, robust estimation of the standard errors clustered on each 
university is carried out. This also controls for unobserved heterogeneity between the 
cases. Aside from the high collinearity generated by inclusion of the quadratic terms 
for task complexity and size, and the interaction between the two, the average VIF 
18 
 
score for the independent variables is about 2.3. The results are therefore unlikely to 
be seriously GLVWRUWHGE\PXOWLFROOLQHDULW\%RZHUPDQDQG2¶&RQQHOO 1990).  
Fixed effects estimates derived to permit the systematic exploration of 
variations in administrative intensity are presented below in Tables 2 and 3. The 
fixed-effects within estimator models the temporal variance within universities and 
ignores cross-sectional variance between these organizations. It takes account of 
university-specific (unobserved fixed) effects and permits correlations between those 
effects and the (observed) effects of the explanatory variables, both of which can bias 
random-effects estimates (Halaby 2004). As a result, the fixed effects estimates 
capture university-specific influences on administrative intensity that may have 
changed very little during the study period, such as the academic reputation of a 
university.  
Before applying a fixed effects model, it is important to establish its efficiency 
as an estimator in comparison with the random effects estimator. To do this it is 
necessary to compare the covariance matrix of the regressors in a fixed-effects model 
with those in a random-effects model which does not permit correlations between 
unobserved and observed effects (Greene 2003). Using the Hausman test, systematic 
differences were observed between the coefficients for fixed and random effects 
models of change over time within universities. As a result, the fixed effects estimates 
that we present below are more efficient than random effects estimates.  
We present our statistical results in the following sequence. Three sets of 
estimates are presented in table 2: model 1 analyses the separate effects of task 
complexity and size on administrative intensity; model 2 adds squared versions of the 
task complexity and size variables to the model; while model 3 adds a variable 
interacting task complexity and size to model 2. Turning to the results presented in 
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Table 2, we can see that the first model provides a decent level of statistical 
explanation of within-variations in the administrative intensity in universities. The R2 
is 46% and is statistically significant. Aside from the ratio of undergraduate to 
postgraduate students, the control variables appear to have little effect on the 
administrative intensity measure. By contrast, the coefficients for both independent 
variables are negative and statistically significant. Thus, increased task complexity 
and size appear to result in a lower proportion of expenditure being allocated to 
administration than to service production, which provides some support for the 
internal economies of scope and scale perspectives, rather than the complexity-
administrative growth hypothesis. However, to fully explore the influence of these 
measures on administrative intensity, it is necessary to include the squared versions of 
the complexity and size variables in the model.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Once the effects of the squared variables are also estimated, the statistical 
power of the model increases by about 8 per cent (the R2 rises from 0.46 to 0.54). At 
the same time, two of the control variables achieve statistical significance. Turning to 
the independent variables of principal interest, the results for the task complexity and 
size measures reveal, as hypothesized, a u-shaped relationship between both variables 
and administrative intensity. This indicates that as the number of departments and 
staff in universities grows, so the relative spend on administration compared to the 
delivery of teaching and research falls, but that at a certain point these effects are 
reversed. Further analysis revealed that for those universities that had on average 
twenty-three or more departments for the study period, the task complexity-
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administrative intensity relationship turned from negative to positive. Twenty-six UK 
universities averaged more than this many departments during the study period, 
suggesting that the rate of administrative expenditure may reflect the high transaction 
costs of the centre dealing with the growth of so many separate departments. The 
equivalent turning-point for the size-administrative relationship is about 8,978 staff. 
Only three universities in the UK averaged this many employees during the study 
period (Cambridge, Manchester and Oxford). This implies that it is not the norm for 
large universities to devote an especially high share of their expenditure to 
administration. Only the very biggest universities have unusually large administrative 
overheads. 
To explore whether institutions with lots of departments and staff have a 
bigger administrative function we add a variable multiplying the complexity and size 
measures together to the statistical model. Inclusion of this variable leads to a 
statistically significant improvement of WKHPRGHO¶VH[SODQDWRU\SRZHU of about 2 per 
cent (see final column in table 2). The interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that increases in task complexity and size are likely to produce 
an increase in administrative intensity in UK universities. Thus, we find substantial 
support for our third hypothesis about the challenges of managing complex and large 
public service organizations: the combination of lots of sub-units and a large number 
of employees appears likely to prompt coordination problems, which require more 
expenditure on administration.  
To fully explore interaction effects it is necessary to calculate the marginal 
effects on the dependent variable of varying levels of the key independent variables 
(see Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). Graphing the slope and confidence intervals 
of the marginal effects is an especially effective way to present this information. 
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Accordingly, Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the moderating influence of 
increasing size on the relationship between task complexity and the growth of 
administrative intensity within universities during the study perod.  
 
[Position of FIGURE 1]  
 
The centre line in figure 1 illustrates the predicted values of administrative 
intensity on the basis of organizational size and task complexity, while controlling for 
all the other variables included in our model. The dotted lines represent the upper and 
lower bounds of the confidence intervals for those predicted values. The area above 
the upper bound and below the horizontal zero line indicates the presence of a 
statistically significant relationship. The figure therefore confirms that organization 
size is likely to have an important effect on the relationship between task complexity 
and the ratio of administrative to production expenditure.  
Substantive interpretation of figure 1 suggests that as staffing levels rise from 
their minimum level the negative complexity-administrative intensity relationship 
becomes weaker until at about 6,800 employees (more than two standard deviations 
above the mean university size for the study period) any potential administrative 
scope economies associated with a large number of departments are entirely lost. This 
implies that the five universities with, on average, 6,800 employees or more during 
the study period devoted the same proportion of resources to central administration to 
manage the multiple production units that they coordinate as their smaller 
counterparts. To explore whether the reduction of scope economies associated with 
large size is simultaneously mirrored in a reduction of scale economies due to 
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increased complexity it is necessary to graph the moderating influence of task 
complexity on the size-intensity relationship. 
 
[Position of FIGURE 2] 
 
Figure 2 suggests that the relative degree of task complexity does have an 
effect on the relationship between size and the ratio of administrative to production 
expenditure. However, it is not strong enough to completely overturn the 
adminstrative scale economies that large universities are able to capture. As the 
number of departments rises, the negative size-administrative intensity relationship 
becomes progressively weaker right through the range of the data. Importantly 
though, the negative scale effect disappears at about 31 departments, which is beyond 
the range of the data for UK universities during the study period. Even so, this 
indicates that universities with a large number of departments are likely to assign 
fewer resources to the corporate centre for the purpose of managing increases in 
staffing than their less complex counterparts. Taken in combination, our results 
suggest that complex organizations may find it hard to effectively manage staffing 
increases, but that big organizations can more readily accommodate greater functional 
complexity. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this article we set out to examine whether task complexity and the size of public 
organizations are related to the resources devoted to administration. Our statistical 
results indicate that these variables have statistically significant effects on 
administrative intensity. The relationship between both complexity and size and 
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administrative intensity is nonlinear. Separately, these variables exhibit a u-shaped 
relationship with administrative intensity (albeit only for very large universities), 
while in combination they have a positive impact on the growth of the administrative 
function. Our findings on administrative intensity therefore offer some corroboration 
of both the complexity-administrative growth and the internal economies of scope and 
scale arguments. As such, they represent an important contribution to the body of 
knowledge on the challenges of managing large and complex public organizations.  
          Our statistical evidence is consistent with a core proposition of contingency 
theory that organizations adapt their internal characteristics in response to changes in 
other aspects of their structure.  Thus complexity and size can be seen as constraints 
that influence decisions on administrative intensity.  Our analysis reveals a general 
and systematic pattern of links between how complex or large an organization is and 
the proportion of resources allocated to central administrative tasks.  In this sense, 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH LQWHQVLW\ LV SDUWO\ µGHWHUPLQHG¶ E\ VKLIWV LQ RWKHU RUJDQL]DWLRQDl 
characteristics.  This does not imply that organizational leaders have no freedom of 
choice about the level of intensity, but their decisions to alter the size of the central 
administration are clearly contingent upon changes in complexity and size. 
Our evidence supports three general conclusions: (a) public organizations with 
a small number of departments and a small number of employees devote a bigger 
share of their financial resources to administration; (b) very complex organizations 
are likely to have higher administrative overheads, and are unable to absorb the 
administrative costs associated with organizational growth; and (c) very large 
organizations, for the most part, have lower administrative overheads than smaller 
institutions and are able to absorb the costs associated with increased task complexity. 
24 
 
Thus, changes in the number of tasks and in the number of staff that are employed 
appear to have major implications for the relative scale of the administrative function.  
For decision-makers, our findings pose important questions about how to get 
the right balance between the functions and structure of their institutions. Our study 
does not offer a hard and fast solution to the question of the optimal level of 
horizontal differentiation nor the optimal size of an organization, but it does highlight 
that institutional expansion may have unanticipated administrative costs. For small 
and specialized organizations, growth appears likely to bring lower overheads as the 
potential for internal scope and scale economies is realised. For larger and more 
complex institutions, WKH WDVNRIFHQWUDO FRRUGLQDWLRQRI WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VDFWLYLWLHV
appears to be made more resource-intensive as expansion occurs, especially for those  
with a wide range of tasks.  
 The findings we present raise further questions about the relationship between 
task complexity, size and administrative intensity in public organizations that are 
worthy of systematic analysis. Firstly,  the effects we observe may not emerge in a 
context of decline rather than expansion, when management is under greater pressure 
to balance efficiency and effectiveness (Cyert 1978). Freeman (1979) shows that the 
administrative function tends to grow especially quickly during periods of 
organizational growth, and to remain stable in times of decline. Secondly, we evaluate 
the effects of only task complexity and size. There are several other aspects of the 
internal structure of organizations that merit closer attention, especially vertical 
differentiation. Evidence on the impact of the number of layers of management on 
administrative intensity would offer valuable lessons for policy-makers seeking 
guidance about appropriate organizational design.   
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Thirdly, it is possible that the relationships between complexity and size and 
administrative intensity are a product of reverse causation. Or put differently, that a 
large central bureaucracy is the precursor to an expansion (or reduction) in the 
number of production units and the number of staff within public organizations. To 
further test the robustness of our findings, we therefore carried out Granger tests to 
ascertain whether complexity and size determine administrative intensity, or vice 
versa. These tests revealed that there is not a statistically significant relationship 
between the lagged administrative intensity measure and either task complexity or 
size.  Still, much more could be done to fully tease out the causal mechanisms that 
underpin the relationships that we observe using both longer panels of data and 
qualitative case study methods based on interviews with key actors.  
Finally, it would also be valuable in future quantitative studies to pay attention 
to the role of administrative intensity in determining the relative success or failure of 
public organizations. For example, research on the performance of local governments 
suggests that there is an optimum size for the administrative function (Andrews and 
Boyne 2011), while other studies point to the role of administrative capacity in 
buffering public organizations from challenging environmental circumstances (Meier 
DQG 2¶7RROH 2009). It is also conceivable that other organizational factors, such as 
mergers with other institutions, governance structure or strategy, may play a role in 
determining the scale of the administrative function.  
For now, our conclusion is that, on their own, neither arguments on the link 
between complexity and administrative growth, nor those on economies of scale and 
scope, tell the whole story on the bureaucratic component of public organizations.  It 
is these theoretical perspectives in combination that offer the best understanding of 
administrative intensity.  This means that, in line with contingency theory, there are 
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QR DGMXVWPHQWV WR FRPSOH[LW\ DQG VL]H WKDW DUH OLNHO\ WR EH µMXVW ULJKW¶ IRU DOO
organizations.  Rather, the outcome of decisions to become larger or smaller, or more 
or less complex, will depend on where organizations are starting from, and how 
adjustments to these organizational characteristics work in combination to influence 
the share of resources devoted to administration.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
Entire study period (2003-08) Mean Min Max S.D. 
Academic depts spend ¶RRRV 66672.66 2155 
Cumbria 
319105 
Manchester 
49046.27 
Admin services spend ¶RRRV 21258.27 1678 
Lampeter 
110826 
Cambridge 
12985.94 
Admin /academic spend (x 100) 36.92 12.59 
1RWW¶P7UHQW 
124.25 
Cumbria 
14.41 
Departments 18.51 5 
Cranfield 
30 
Leeds 
5.07 
Staff  2820.56 205 
Cumbria 
10210 
Manchester 
1863.69 
Budget surplus ¶RRRV 2385.53 
 
-27504 
Manchester 
26446 
LSE 
5509.94 
Spend per head of staff ¶RRRV 54.43 23.01 
Birkbeck 
128.02 
Cambridge 
12.83 
% academic staff (teaching only) 22.44 .00 
Several 
95.45 
Cumbria 
18.07 
% academic staff (research only) 16.66 .00 
Several 
66.40 
Oxford 
15.70 
% technical support staff  6.93 .00 
Several 
17.12 
Cambridge 
2.61 
Number of degree courses 90.86 15 
Cumbria 
193 
Manchester 
32.88 
Undergraduate/postgraduate ratio 3.98 
 
.00 
Cranfield 
41.00 
Cumbria 
2.96 
Start of study period (2003) Mean Min Max S.D. 
Academic depts spend ¶RRRV 54507.08 2155 176997 37374.06 
Admin services spend ¶RRRV 15982.46 1678 58621 8674.24 
Admin /academic spend (x 100) 34.15 12.59 102.92 12.49 
Departments 18.01 5 28 4.86 
Staff  2618.29 205 8195 1728.40 
Budget surplus ¶RRRV 1897.58 -8857 16331 3592.01 
Spend per head of staff ¶RRRV 47.73 24.20 80.33 9.31 
% academic staff (teaching only) 20.47 .00 95.45 18.28 
% academic staff (research only) 17.21 .00 63.20 16.11 
% technical support staff  7.43 1.85 17.12 2.72 
Number of degree courses 88.75 16 188 32.29 
Undergraduate/postgraduate ratio 4.17 .08 41.00 4.07 
End of study period (2008) Mean Min Max S.D. 
Academic depts spend ¶RRRV 79749.51 6193 319105 57339.53 
Admin services spend ¶RRRV 28042.26 4046 110826 15758.67 
Admin /academic spend (x 100) 40.39 15.67 76.35 12.70 
Departments 18.50 5 30 4.99 
Staff  3012.54 320 9850 1985.88 
Budget surplus ¶RRRV 3385.62 -15525 26250 7509.49 
Spend per head of staff ¶RRRV 62.83 35.06 128.02 13.75 
% academic staff (teaching only) 23.51 .00 87.31 18.44 
% academic staff (research only) 16.07 .00 66.40 15.86 
% technical support staff  6.54 1.56 14.29 2.49 
Number of degree courses 91.91 27 193 32.81 
Undergraduate/postgraduate ratio 3.85 .00 14.88 2.05 
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Table 2  
Task complexity, size and central administrative intensity (2003/04-08/09)  
 
Independent variable Linear model Nonlinear model Nonlinear model 
(incl interaction) 
Departments -1.2368** 
(.486) 
-4.0873** 
(1.2716) 
-4.1377** 
(1.1108) 
Departments2  .0900** 
(.0306) 
.0652* 
(.0287) 
Staff -.0068** 
(.0023) 
-.0167** 
(.0053) 
-.0188** 
(.0047) 
Staff2  9.30E-07** 
(3.72E-07) 
5.85E-07+ 
(3.20E-07) 
Departments x staff   .0003** 
(.0001) 
Budget surplus -.00005 
(.0001) 
-1.49E-05 
(.0001) 
8.44E-06 
(.0001) 
Expenditure per head of staff .0982 
(.1078) 
-.1829 
(.1154) 
-.1484 
(.1094) 
% academic staff (teaching only) .1065 
(.0899) 
.0908 
(.0697) 
.0907 
(.0670) 
% academic staff (research only) .0634 
(.1299) 
.0745 
(.1125) 
.1003 
(.1065) 
% technical support staff  -.6566 
(.6253) 
-.5974 
(.4643) 
-.4529 
(.4213) 
Number of degree courses .0252 
(.0666) 
-.0186 
(.0488) 
-.0250 
(.0469) 
Undergraduate/postgraduate ratio 1.1804** 
(.2129) 
.6434* 
(.2698) 
.5188+ 
(.2670) 
Constant 71.7355** 
(13.0068) 
132.6641** 
(19.8959) 
133.8175** 
(18.3232) 
F-statistic 17.94** 21.78** 18.47** 
R2 .46 .54 .56 
N of observations 684 684 684 
Note: VLJQLILFDQFH OHYHOV S     S     S   WZR-tailed test). Standard errors 
shown in parentheses. Coefficients for individual year dummies not shown. 
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Figure 1 Marginal Impact of Departments on Ratio of Central Administrative to 
Academic Costs Contingent on Size 
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Figure 2 Marginal Impact of Size on Ratio of Central Administrative to 
Academic Costs Contingent on Departments 
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 Appendix A: Academic Cost Centres in UK Universities (incl. HESA coding) 
 
01 Clinical medicine 
02 Clinical dentistry 
03 Veterinary science 
04 Anatomy & physiology 
05 Nursing & paramedical studies 
06 Health & community studies 
07 Psychology & behavioural sciences 
08 Pharmacy & pharmacology 
10 Biosciences 
11 Chemistry 
12 Physics 
13 Agriculture & forestry 
14 Earth, marine & environmental sciences 
16 General engineering 
17 Chemical engineering 
18 Mineral, metallurgy & materials engineering 
19 Civil engineering 
20 Electrical, electronic & computer engineering 
21 Mechanical, aero & production engineering 
23 Architecture, built environment & planning  
24 Mathematics 
25 Information technology & systems sciences & computer software engineering 
26 Catering & hospitality management 
27 Business & management studies 
28 Geography 
29 Social studies 
30 Media studies 
31 Humanities & language based studies 
33 Design & creative arts 
34 Education  
35 Modern languages 
37 Archaeology 
38 Sports science & leisure studies 
41 Continuing education 
 
Note: The HESA coding for the study period no longer includes certain categories of cost centre, but 
for the purposes of continuity has not been revised by HESA in light of those deletions. 
 
 
  
 
